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Abstract 
We analyze the dynamics of price jumps and the impact of the European debt crisis using the 
high-frequency data reported by selected stock exchanges on the European continent during 
the period January 2008 to June 2012. We employ two methods to identify price jumps: 
Method 1 minimizes the probability of false jump detection (the Type-II Error-Optimal price 
jump indicator) and Method 2 maximizes the probability of successful jump detection (the 
Type-I Error-Optimal price jump indicator). We show that individual stock markets exhibited 
differences in price jump intensity before and during the crisis. We also show that in general 
the variance of price jump intensity could not be distinguished as different in the pre-crisis 
period from that during the crisis. Our results indicate that, contrary to common belief, the 
intensity of price jumps does not uniformly increase during a period of financial distress. 
However, there do exist differences in price jump dynamics across stock markets and 
investors have to model emerging and mature markets differently to properly reflect their 
individual dynamics. 
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1. Introduction: Motivation and Literature 
It is widely accepted that periods of financial turbulence cause higher volatility on markets as 
investors tend to over-react to negative information (Anderson et al., 2007). Further, price 
jumps have been recognized in the financial literature as a significant part of volatility since 
the seminal Merton (1976). A price jump is understood as an abrupt price change over a very 
short time that is related to a broad range of market phenomena that cannot be connected to a 
noisy Gaussian distribution (Lahaye et al., 2011; Lee, 2012; Zheng and Shen, 2008). 
However, so far research is surprisingly scarce on how the distribution of price jumps change 
during turbulent periods and whether its pattern differs across mature and emerging financial 
markets. In this paper we analyze price jumps in market indices reported by selected stock 
exchanges on the European continent and their behavior before and after the European debt 
crisis unfolded. 
The financial literature considers a number of ways to classify market volatility. For our 
analysis the most important aspect is the decomposition of volatility into regular noise (the 
Gaussian-like component) and price jumps.1 The literature supports two main explanations of 
the source of price jumps. First, price jumps can reflect the market reaction to unexpected 
information, which indicates that news announcements are the primary source of price jumps 
(Lee and Mykland, 2008; Lahaye et al., 2011). Second, Bouchaud et al. (2006) and Joulin et 
al. (2008) advocate that jumps are mainly caused by a local lack of liquidity on the market, an 
event they term “relative liquidity.” In addition, an inefficient provision of liquidity caused by 
an imbalanced market micro-structure can cause extreme price movements as well (see the 
survey in Madhavan, 2000). 
Hence, price jump identification is valuable for a number of reasons. Price jumps can 
serve as a proxy for information arrival and be utilized as tools for studying market efficiency 
(Fama, 1970) or phenomena like information-driven trading; see e.g., Cornell and Sirri (1992) 
or Kennedy et al. (2006). Further, non-Gaussian price movements influence the models and 
indicators employed in finance, such as value-at-risk, or the performance of various financial 
vehicles (Heston, 1993; Bates, 1996; Scott, 1997; Gatheral, 2006). Also, a good knowledge of 
price jump distribution is potentially useful for financial regulators to implement the most 
optimal policies; see Becketti and Roberts (1990) or Tiniç (1995). 
The financial literature identifies the key reason underlying the importance of detecting 
price jumps: the presence of jumps has serious consequences for financial risk management 
1 This separation can be seen in the first pioneering papers dealing with price jumps (see e.g., Merton, 1976 or a 
summary in Gatheral, 2006). Recently, the division of the Gaussian-like component and price jumps was used by 
Giot et al. (2010). Although the original motivation for this decomposition was of a purely mathematical nature, 
it can be advocated by practitioners as well. 
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and pricing. The recent literature offers empirical support of this claim. Broadie and Jain 
(2008) show that the pricing of swaps significantly differs when jumps are taken into account 
and one cannot appropriately price risk while ignoring jumps. Arshanapalli et al. (2013) 
support the need to include the jump component into risk measures to estimate the proper risk-
return relationship. Carr and Wu (2010) use a jump diffusion model to simultaneously price 
stock options and credit default swaps and find a significant presence of the interplay between 
credit and market risks. A similar confirmation of the change in the pricing mechanism was 
also shown by Duffie et al. (2000), Liu et al. (2003), and Johannes (2004). Jarrow and 
Rosenfeld (1984), Nietert (2001), and Pan (2002) study pricing in the presence of jumps and 
all of them confirm the presence of the jump risk premium. Further, Caporin et al. (2011) 
analyze even the presence of price jumps in volatility. 
Despite the importance of analyzing jumps, the literature on jumps in European stock 
markets is rather limited. Novotný et al. (2013) analyze the behavior and performance of 
multiple price jump indicators across developed and emerging markets by employing high-
frequency stock market data from Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the USA, 
the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. They identify clusters of price jump indicators 
with similar performance and show that clusters differ in size and are stable across stock 
market indices and over time. In this respect the recent 2007–2008 financial crisis did not 
seem to affect the overall jumpiness of mature or emerging stock markets. Further, Hanousek 
et al. (2013) show that many price jumps identified on emerging European stock markets are 
due to foreign macroeconomic news. Further, a significant transfer of price jumps from EU 
and U.S. markets is also noted, with the latter having a stronger influence. Finally, Hanousek 
and Novotný (2013) analyze the impact of the Lehman Brothers collapse on volatility and 
price jumps in the US and Czech stock markets, and show only limited reaction to this type of 
financial distress. 
In this paper we analyze how the financial distress affects the distribution and dynamics of 
price jumps on several stock markets. The financial distress is represented by the European 
debt crisis that fully unfolded in May 2010 and evolved into a state where it was difficult or 
impossible for several Eurozone member countries to repay or refinance their government 
debts without the assistance of third parties. We aim to analyze the effect of this market-
exogenous event on jump behavior across markets. In particular, we aim to study to what 
extent one can observe the similarities and transfers of price jumps from developed capital 
markets to emerging stock markets in Europe. Our choice to study both developed and 
emerging capital markets in Europe is based on several reasons. First, compared to other 
emerging stock markets, European emerging markets do not suffer so much from potential 
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economic and political instability. Second, they are under the strong influence of developed 
stock markets (Hanousek et al. 2009), hence, the potential for influence is one-directional. In 
the end we analyze data from developed stock markets in the UK and Germany, while 
emerging markets are represented by the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania, 
Croatia, Slovenia, and Turkey. The emerging markets share several common features: their 
overall liquidity and number of traded stocks are rather small, the price formation mechanism 
is under the strong influence of foreign news originating in mature EU and US markets, and 
despite their smaller size, the share of overall trading volume performed by foreign investors 
in the emerging stock markets is substantial (Hanousek and Kočenda, 2011). 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we define price jumps and connect them to the 
period of distress. Second, we describe our methodology to detect price jumps and to measure 
intensity. We also formulate our testable hypotheses. In section 3 we describe our high-
frequency data. We employ a number of stock market indices and show that there is a sound 
reason for potential price jump transfers and overall dynamics between jumps originating in 
and transferred among countries. Then we analyze the price jump patterns that materialized in 
our selected stock market indices and analyze how the behavior of price jumps changed after 
the European debt crisis unfolded. The results of our analysis are presented in section 5. 
Finally, we summarize the findings and implications in the concluding section. 
 
2. Price Jumps and European Debt Crisis 
In this section, we provide a model of log-price dynamics and formalize the effect of the 
financial distress due to the European debt crisis in a model of volatility and in particular of 
price jumps. Consequently, the identification of price jumps is elaborated in detail. 
 
2.1. Price Jumps 
Generally, a price jump is understood as an abrupt price movement that is very large when 
compared to the current market situation. The advantage of this definition is that it is model- 
independent: it does not require any specific underlying price-generating process. On the other 
hand, this definition is too general and rather vague and hence not useful for any statistical 
inference or testing. Therefore, we formalize the general approach by assuming that the log-
price Y={𝑌𝑡}0≤𝑡≤1 is defined on the probability space (Ω,𝐹, {𝐹𝑡}0≤𝑡≤1,𝑃) over time interval 
[0,1]. The log-price process is a semi-martingale and its dynamics in continuous time can be 
specified by the stochastic differential equation 
   𝑑𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑡𝑑𝑊𝑡 + 𝑑𝐽𝑡,     (1) 
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where 𝜇𝑡  and 𝜎𝑡  are processes driving the drift and volatility, 𝑑𝑊𝑡 is a standard Brownian 
motion and the term 𝑑𝐽𝑡 represents the pure jump Levy process; see, for example, Merton 
(1976) or Jacod and Shiryaev (1987). In the following, we consider finite activity jumps (Aït-
Sahalia and Jacod, 2011) and factorize the Levy processes as 𝑌𝑡𝑑𝑁𝑡. The first component 
corresponds to a random process driving the magnitude of price jumps, while the latter one 
drives the arrival. 
For the arrival process, we assume that the jumps arrive at finite activity. Therefore, the 
arrival process  𝑑𝑁𝑡 takes a value of 0 or 1 and can be expressed as 𝑑𝑁𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑑𝜆𝑡|𝐼𝑡], where 
the instantaneous intensity 𝑑𝜆𝑡 is time dependent and may depend on the exogenous 
economic variables and 𝐼𝑡 is the information set available up to time t. In this paper, we focus 
on the long-term variation in the levels of intensity at a particular sampling of the data dt. We 
therefore define the average intensity 𝜆[0,𝑇] = ∫ 𝑑𝜆𝑡𝑇0 = ∫ 𝐸[𝑑𝑁𝑡]𝑇0  with the meaning of the 
probability of a price jump arrival being at any time step 𝑑𝑡 out of the interval [0,T]. The 
average intensity captures the long-term variation in the probability of price jump arrivals 
while it smooths out the fact that price jumps arrivals are rare events and thus most of the time 
there are no arrivals.  
 
2.2. Financial Distress: European Debt Crisis 
The global financial crisis in 2008 emerged as a consequence of excessive lending in the US 
debt market. The consequences of this crisis transferred to the European continent where the 
increased sensitivity to risk uncovered the structural fiscal problems of many European 
economies. Hence, following the worsened global economic development during 2008-2009, 
the European debt crisis evolved into a situation where it was difficult or impossible for 
several Eurozone member countries to repay or re-finance their government debts without 
the assistance of third parties. The situation was made even worse by the 
undercapitalization and liquidity problems of Eurozone banks. As a side effect, the crisis 
also exerted a major political impact on many European countries. Therefore, in this study, 
we explicitly focus on the European debt crisis that fully unfolded in May 2010. 
This event was not by its nature preceded by an drop in capital markets. We therefore 
consider this event an exogenous trigger with the potential to affect capital markets. To 
understand the impact of a financial event like this, we associate the distressed period with a 
structural break in the sample. The distress period begins on May 1, 2010 and ends on June 
30, 2013. From a technical point of view the beginning date coincides with the date when the 
Greek government announced a series of austerity measures in order to receive an external 
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loan from the rest of the Eurozone and the IMF worth 110 billion euro, payable in three 
years at a 5.5% interest rate (Lane, 2012).2 Other actions with respect to other Eurozone 
countries followed later on. In general, the period after May 2010 is characterized by the 
contagion of financial risk, increased volatility, and financial distress. This motivates us to 
choose May 1, 2010 as an exogenous breakpoint, since it is when the European debt crisis 
fully appeared and affected the performance and behavior of individual European stock 
markets. 
To capture financial distress formally, i.e. following the data-generating process assumed 
in equation (1), we define the indicator (dummy) variable 𝐹𝑡 as the risk factor indicator that 
takes a value of one during financial distress and zero otherwise. 
First, the stylized facts suggest that spot volatility 𝜎𝑡  will be a function of 𝐹𝑡 with the 
following effect: 
𝜎𝑡 = 𝜎𝑡(𝐹𝑡) with 𝐸[𝜎𝑡(𝐹𝑡)|𝐹𝑡− = 1] > 𝐸[𝜎𝑡(𝐹𝑡)|𝐹𝑡− = 0],   (6) 
which in plain English means that the expected spot volatility during the distress period is 
strictly bigger than that during usual market conditions. Second, the distress period will have 
an effect on the price jump term as well. There are two possible channels how distress can 
impact the price jump term  𝑌𝑡𝑑𝐽𝑡: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡(𝐹𝑡)  with  𝐸[𝑌𝑡(𝐹𝑡)|𝐹𝑡− = 1] > 𝐸[𝑌𝑡(𝐹𝑡)|𝐹𝑡− = 0], 
𝑑𝐽𝑡 = 𝑑𝐽𝑡(𝜆𝑡(𝐹𝑡))  with  𝐸[𝜆𝑡(𝐹𝑡)|𝐹𝑡− = 1] > 𝐸[𝜆𝑡(𝐹𝑡)|𝐹𝑡− = 0], (7) 
where the first line means that the magnitude of price jumps increases during distress, while 
the second line tells us that rate of price jumps increases during distress without influencing 
the magnitude. The effect of financial distress expressed in (6) and (7) reflects the obvious 
intuition: financial distress increases market volatility as well as the rate and significance of 
rare and substantial price movements (price jumps). One can measure the arrival of price 
jumps by their average intensity as 
𝝀[0,𝑇] = 𝑁𝑗𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑁𝑗𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑠+𝑁𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑗𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑠 ,      (8) 
2 A brief note about the Greek financial problems in this period: around 2000, the Greek economy had a large 
structural deficit along with fast growth. However, the Greek economy was severely affected by the global 
financial crisis, especially because global trade collapsed at the same time that tourism declined. Greece 
responded with a pseudo-Keynesian plan to taking on huge government debt to support economic performance. 
Unfortunately, markets reacted negatively to this plan, worried about the negative consequences of such debt as 
the debt grew more rapidly than expected. The debt problem resulted in Greece not able to borrow on the open 
market. A loan of 45 billion Euro was requested by Greece from the IMF and EU in April 2010 just to keep basic 
government operations going, and this request itself plunged Greece’s government bonds to below investment 
grade. Soon after, in May 2010, the Greek government responded to public protest by announcing a series of 
austerity measures and admitting the difficulty of the situation. For more information, see IMF (2012), 
Malkoutzis (2011), and Nechio (2010).  
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where Njumps and Nnon-jumps denotes the number of jumps and the number of non-jumps, 
respectively, over a given time interval [0,T].3  
We employ two different methods for the identification of price jumps (defined in detail in 
the methodology section) and aim to verify the intuition related to the price jump term; in 
particular, that we observe different intensities of price jumps during financial distress. For 
that purpose, we need to define the distress period exogenously and hence we use the 
European debt crisis as an exogenous factor defining the distressed period. Later, we will use 
(6), (7), and (8) and different identifications of price jumps to statistically analyze to what 
extent we observe significant differences in the volatility and jump process during the 
financial distress period. 
The dependence of the diffusive and price jump terms on the risk factor 𝐹𝑡  allows us to 
analyze the changes in the price jump intensities across different markets. Our distress model 
does not contain any explicit correlation across markets since we do not aim to model the 
immediate response of price jumps in one market to another as was done by Aït-Sahalia et al. 
(2010). Rather, we use high-frequency data to describe the change in market regimes due to 
financial distress, where the driver of the distress is believed to be exogenous to the markets 
and any correlation is therefore realized through the distress factor. Our model framework thus 
resembles the approach in the Mixed Data Sampling (MIDAS) literature; see Ghysels et al. 
(2007). It is worth noting that this methodology can be reverted to identify the distress period. 
Thus, by assuming that the distress period is defined as a regime with increased volatility and 
increased price jump arrival, or, alternatively, an increased contribution of price jumps to the 
overall market volatility, we may devise an algorithm to search for a period where these 
conditions are significantly satisfied. For the purpose of this analysis, however, we work 
with the exogenously given distress period. 
 
3. Methodology 
In this section, we describe how to test the impact of the European debt crisis on the price-
generating process with a special focus on price jumps. In our analysis we employ two 
different approaches for price jump detection. Method 1, devised by Lee and Mykland (2008), 
primarily aims to isolate price jumps using integrated variance. Method 2, suggested by Aït-
Sahalia and Jacod (2009), is based on the detection of extreme returns using percentiles. Both 
3 Definition (8) is an empirical counterpart of the theoretical considerations mentioned in (1). In particular, 
because of the discrete character of the price jump process, the average intensity defined in (8) corresponds to the 
original definition 𝜆[0,𝑇] = 𝐸[𝑑𝑁𝑡]. Originally (the theoretical definition of) intensity corresponds to the 
probability of price jump arrival at time step 𝑑𝑡 in the interval [0,T], In (8) the meaning remains the same. It is an 
estimate of the proportion, i.e., of the probability of jump occurrence in the interval [0, T]. 
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methods also differ in the way they identify price jumps from a purely statistical perspective. 
In this sense, we employ two methods that can be linked to two extreme cases with respect to 
hypothesis testing and were identified in a large simulation study in Hanousek et al. (2012). 
Specifically, Method 2 is identified as a Type-I Error-Optimal indicator that maximizes the 
identification of true price jumps. Method 1 can be understood as a Type-II Error-Optimal 
indicator, which minimizes incorrect price jump identification.4 In other words, in our 
analysis Type-I error identification (Method 2) would capture both price jumps and the 
volatility structure, while Type-II error identification (Method 1) would target primarily the 
price jumps. 
In order to study the effects of the European debt crisis on stock market behavior we 
will compare the intensities of detected price jumps over different periods and markets. We 
introduce the form of both methods below. 
 
3.1 Method 1: Integrated-variance-based method 
In order to estimate the key variable of this paper, the average intensity 𝜆[0,𝑇], we have to date 
and count the total number of price jump arrivals over time interval [0,T]. For that purpose, 
we employ the Lee and Mykland (2008) test statistics given as  
𝐿𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡�𝐼𝑉𝑡 ,  (8) 
where 𝑟𝑡  is a log-return and 𝐼𝑉𝑡 is an instantaneous Integrated Variance, which captures the 
variance of  σt dWt while neglecting the contribution from 𝑑𝐽𝑡. Then, the test itself is based on 
the variable 𝜉𝑛, which is defined as 
𝐿𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡∈𝐴𝑛 |𝐿𝑡|−𝐶𝑛𝑆𝑛  → 𝜉𝑛, (9) 
where 𝐴𝑛  is the tested region with n observations and 𝐶𝑛 are parameters 𝑆𝑛. This statistics was 
found in a large simulation study performed by Hanousek et al. (2012) as being the optimal 
price jump indicator with respect to Type II error. This method minimizes the probability of the 
false detection of jumps.  
To estimate the Integrated Variance, we use Andersen, Dobrev, and Schaumburg (2012)’s  
median-based method, for which the estimator for 𝐼𝑉𝑡  is given as 
𝐼𝑉𝑡 = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑉𝑡 = 𝜋6−4√3+𝜋 𝑛𝑛−2∑ 𝑚𝑒𝑑(|𝑟𝑡−2|, |𝑟𝑡−1||𝑟𝑡|)2𝑛𝑖=2  ,    (10) 
4 In the literature, the Type-I error criterion is known as optimization with respect to the power of the test; in 
diagnostic analysis it is usually called the optimization of the positive-negative probability. Similarly, Type-II 
error optimality is usually presented as optimality with respect to the size of the test, while in diagnostic analysis 
it is typically called the optimization of the false-negative probability. 
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where n denotes the number of past returns in the window to estimate the Integrated Variance 
for the return 𝑟𝑡 .  
 
3.2 Method 2: Detecting price jumps using extreme returns 
Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2009) defined types of jump indicator where the price process is 
assumed to be decomposed into the Gaussian component corresponding to normal (white) 
noise and the non-homogenous Poisson component corresponding to price jumps. Therefore, 
when a significant price jump appears, the price increment is dominated by the non-
homogenous Poisson element. On the other hand, when the price movements are governed 
solely by Gaussian noise, the average and/or maximum magnitudes of such increments can be 
estimated. Therefore, one can use these properties and set a threshold value that will 
effectively distinguish the two components, i.e. predict jumps. 
Let us assume that the underlying price increment (∆S) process is given as 
∆S=σ∆X+∆J, where the price increment is defined as 1−−=∆ tt SSS , and further assume that 
we observe the realization of prices in equidistant time steps Δt. In this definition, X 
corresponds to a Brownian motion and J to a β-stable process. The increments of the two 
components can be expressed as 12
1
)( XtX ∆=∆  and 1
1
)( JtJ β∆=∆  with equalities in 
distribution.  
The different magnitudes in the two components can be used to discriminate between 
the noise components and the big price jumps coming solely from the J-process.5 The big 
price jumps cause JS ∆=∆ (in distribution) with X having a negligible effect, while in the 
presence of no big price jumps, which is most of the time, 12
1
)( XtS ∆=∆ σ . Therefore, we 
can, for a given Δt, choose a threshold value equal to γα )( t∆ , with 0>α  and )2
1,0(∈γ , 
such that if γα )( tS ∆>∆  then ΔS is at a given moment dominated by J with a certain 
probability. 
This argument can be reverted: Assuming the knowledge of the rate of the arrival of big 
jumps, we can imply a corresponding threshold using centiles. Centiles, therefore, serve as a 
prior to form a threshold for discriminating price jumps from the noise. The standard 
approach is (Aït-Sahalia and Jacod, 2009) to decompose these processes by employing 
appropriate threshold levels, or certain percentiles, of the distribution of returns observed over 
5 The J-process contributes to a large amount of small price jumps; however, we want to focus on big price 
jumps only. The goal is not to completely determine the properties of the J-process but rather to determine how 
to discriminate extreme price movements. 
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the entire sample. We employ the 99.5th/0.5th centiles as the upper/lower thresholds and 
define price jumps as those returns that are higher/lower than a given upper/lower centile. 
Method 2 for price jump identification maximizes the probability of the correct price jump 
detection, and it is thus optimal with respect to Type I error. However, there is a chance that it 
may suffer from the overidentification of price jumps: almost any period with an extreme 
return is identified as a jump, even if the extreme value is driven by increased market 
volatility. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
In this paper, we aim to answer the following questions: 
Question A. Is the intensity of price jumps on financial markets different following the 
European debt crisis? 
Question B. Is the homogeneity of financial markets with respect to price jump intensity 
different following the European debt crisis? 
The first question is based on the intuition that an extreme event such as the European debt 
crisis would result in an increase in overall volatility as well as an increase in the number of 
extreme price movements that would result in a greater intensity of jump occurrence. In the 
second question, we explicitly ask whether the European debt crisis caused a change in the 
distribution of price jumps, for example a higher variability in the arrival rate of price jumps 
and intensity. This means that during financial distress, we are likely to observe days with an 
extremely high rate of price jump arrivals, while there can be days that are rather calm as well. 
To answer the above-mentioned questions we use the corresponding statistically testable 
hypotheses. First, we divide the sample of trading days into two sub-samples corresponding to 
periods of standard market conditions and financial distress. Then, we use the daily figures of 
arrived price jumps and form the following two hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis A. H0: The mean of price jump intensity for the two sub-samples, i.e., during 
and not during distress, is the same. 
The main scope of this test is to compare whether the estimated number of price jumps 
changes during the crisis. For that we employ the two-sample Wilcoxon test, which is a non-
parametric test comparing whether two observed samples come from the same distribution 
(Mann and Whitney, 1947; Wilcoxon, 1945). Here we test whether the estimated price jump 
measures for the two sub-samples come from the same distribution. The observations in each 
of the two sub-samples is combined into one sample and then ranked. The z-statistic is 
composed based on the mutual comparison of ranks between the two samples. For large 
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samples, the z-statistic follows a standard normal distribution; 20 and above observations is 
usually sufficient (see Mann and Whitney, 1947 and Wilcoxon, 1945).The null hypothesis of 
the test states that both observed samples come from the same distribution or there is no 
significant asymmetry in the rankings for the two groups. When the calculated z-statistics 
exceeds the critical value, we reject the null hypothesis. In addition, the sign of the z-statistics 
can suggest the position of the medians of the two compared samples. 
 
Hypothesis B. H0: The variance in the jump intensity of the two sub-samples, i.e., during 
and not during distress, is unchanged. 
This test asks the question whether the trading days in either of the two sub-samples were 
on average more heterogeneous. In other words, this procedure tests the heterogeneity of the 
trading days between the sub-samples. To answer the question we employ the standard F-test 
and compare whether the variance of the estimated price jump measures changed during the 
crisis. The F-test is defined as 
𝑆𝐶
2
𝑆𝑁𝑜−𝐶
2 ~𝐹(𝑁𝐶 − 1 ,𝑁𝑁𝑜−𝐶 − 1),   (12) 
where S2 is the standard deviation of the characteristic coefficient calculated during the crisis 
“C” and not during the crisis “No − C”. NC is the number of days the crisis lasts and NNo−C is 
the complement to the total number of days in the sample. 
We aim to test these two hypotheses for different markets. In particular, we plan to 
analyze how price jumps in a developed capital market compare with emerging European 
markets, and also how price jumps transfer from one to the other. Focusing on two types of 
markets allows us to study changes in the price jump distribution in terms of the differences 
between these markets and compare the states of each market both before and after the 
distress. 
 
4. Data description 
Developed European markets are represented by the UK and Germany, while emerging 
markets in Central and South-Eastern Europe are represented by the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, and Turkey. We used the maximum country-data 
coverage for the available high-frequency stock market data. The other countries in the 
regions studied either do not have enough liquidity to consider high-frequency trading or their 
intraday data are not available at all. 
We employ high-frequency (five-minute interval) data of realized prices for each of the 
market indexes. Data from all stock exchanges.-.except the Borsa Istanbul - cover the period 
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from January 1, 2008 to June 30, 2013 and thus cover a sufficiently long enough period before 
and after the European debt crisis. High-frequency data for the Istanbul Stock exchange were 
available to us only for the period July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2013, which provides still enough 
data for similarity and response analyses. 
The key characteristics of the markets and indices under research are presented in Table 
1. We show the market capitalization and turnover ratio on each market at the beginning of 
our research span (in 2008) and one year before its end (in 2012). We also provide data for the 
year when the European debt crisis unfolded (in mid-2010). There is overwhelming evidence 
that until the crisis the market capitalization rose but dropped afterwards; exceptions are 
Prague, where market capitalization is the same in 2008 and 2010 and Ljubljana, where 
market capitalization decreases over time. We can also witness a drop in the turnover ratio on 
the markets under research; exceptions are Bucharest and Ljubljana that record increases. 
For our analysis we use the following set of indices with the corresponding tickers. For 
the European developed markets we use: 
• Ticker UKX represents the FTSE 100 Index (a capitalization-weighted index) of the 
100 most highly capitalized companies traded on the London Stock Exchange.6   
• Ticker DAX that stands for the German (total return) Stock Index of 30 selected 
German blue chip stocks traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The equities use free 
float shares in the index calculation.7 
Emerging markets are represented by the following indices/tickers: 
• Ticker BUX is the capitalization-weighted (total return) index adjusted for free float. 
The index tracks the daily price performance of large, actively traded shares on the 
Budapest Stock Exchange.8   
• Ticker PX stands for the official index of the Prague Stock Exchange, a capitalization-
weighted index based on the free float of all members.9   
6 The equities use investibility weighting in the index calculation. Investibility weighting gives a weight in the 
index based on a free float according to the following bands: 
Free float less than or equal to 15% = ineligible* 
Free float greater than 15% but less than or equal to 20% = 20%  
Free float greater than 20% but less than or equal to 30% = 30% 
Free float greater than 30% but less than or equal to 40% = 40%  
Free float greater than 40% but less than or equal to 50% = 50% 
Free float greater than 50% but less than or equal to 75% = 75% 
Free float greater than 75% = 100% 
The index was developed with a base level of 1000 as of January 3, 1984 (source: Bloomberg, London Stock 
Exchange). 
7 The DAX has a base value of 1,000 as of December 31, 1987. As of June 18, 1999 only XETRA equity prices 
are used to calculate all DAX indices. 
8 The BUX index accounts for 58% of the domestic equity market capitalization. BUX has a base value of 1000 
points as of January 2, 1991. 
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• Ticker WIG, the Warsaw Stock Exchange index, is a total return index that includes 
dividends and pre-emptive rights (subscription rights).10   
• Ticker BET, the Bucharest Exchange Trading Index, is a capitalization-weighted index, 
comprised of the 10 most liquid stocks listed on the BSE tier 1. The index is a price 
index and was developed with a base value of 1000 as of September 22, 1997. 
• Ticker CRO represents CROBEX, which is a capitalization-weighted index designed to 
measure the price movements of shares listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange.11   
• Ticker SBITOP stands for the Slovenian blue chip index. It is a free-float capitalization-
weighted index comprising the most liquid shares traded at Ljubljana Stock Exchange.12   
• Ticker XU100 is used for the Borsa Istanbul National 100 Index, which is a 
capitalization-weighted index composed of National Market companies except 
investment trusts.13  
The general data characteristics are described in Table 2. Data for the covered stocked 
market indices (analyzed at a 5-minute frequency) shows on average low negative returns 
with relatively small deviation. In the majority of cases the realized skewness is negative, 
which means that the distribution of returns have a fatter left tail, or in other words, that 
extreme movements down (large negative returns) tend to be more likely. Kurtosis is clearly 
higher than 3, which means that distributions of returns are fat-tailed (leptokurtic).14 Further, 
the number of detected jumps is relatively large and is naturally higher for Method 2, which 
accounts not only for jumps but also heightened volatility. 
 
5. Results 
For testing the difference in the intensity of the price jumps we employ the Wilcoxon sign test. 
For Type-I Error-Optimal identification (Method 2) we see a clear pattern indicating that we 
observe higher jump intensity during the European debt crisis. The situation is reversed when 
we employ the Type-II Error-Optimal indicator for the detection of price jumps (Method 1). 
9 The index was calculated for the first time on March 20, 2006 when it replaced the PX50 and PX-D indices. 
The index took over the historical values of the PX50 index. The starting date was April 5, 1994 with a base of 
1000 points. As of September 24, 2012, the composition fully reflects the free float of members due to 
methodology changes. 
10 The index includes all companies listed on the main market, excluding foreign companies and investment 
funds. The index base value is 1000 as of April 16, 1991. 
11 It is capped at a maximum 20% weighting of the index capitalization. CROBEX was developed with a base 
level of 1000 beginning September 1, 1997. 
12 Each stock's weighting is capped at 30%. The index was developed with a base level of 1000 as of March 31, 
2006. 
13 The constituents are selected on the basis of pre-determined criteria for the companies to be included in the 
indices. The base date is January 1986 and the base value is 1 for the TL-based price. 
14 The null hypothesis stating that returns are i.i.d. following the normal distribution (Jarque-Bera 1980 statistics) 
implies a rejection of the null hypothesis at a very high confidence level, where the p-value does not exceed 
0.0001 in any case. 
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The main difference is that when we minimize the probability of incorrect jump identification 
(Type-II error), we see that the jump intensity did not dramatically increase during the period 
of financial distress. This discrepancy could be caused by an overall increase in market 
volatility without an unnecessary increase in the rate of price jumps. Because jump prediction 
minimizing the Type-I error uses centiles (i.e., is based on outliers), such a method could 
incorrectly identify a lot of false jumps during a volatile period. 
 
5.1 Jump intensities 
In Tables 3 and 4 we present a pairwise comparison of the jump intensities across the stock 
markets under research. Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the Wilcoxon test on jump 
intensities obtained based on Method 1 and 2, respectively. Each column in each table is 
divided into two sub-columns: in the left sub-column we present the results from before the 
European debt crisis in May 2010 while the right sub-column shows the results afterwards. 
Individual entries in each table show the extent of intensity in price jumps between pairs of 
stock markets that are labeled by the names of the cities where stock exchanges operate. An 
entry (value of the z-statistics) in each table should be read in the following way: a positive 
(negative) number shows that price jump intensity on the market in a given row is larger 
(smaller) than the price jump intensity on the market in a given column. Alternatively, a 
negative number can be interpreted as a stock market in a given column exhibiting greater 
price jump intensity than a stock market in a given row. The larger the coefficient, the larger 
is the difference in jump intensity between the two markets. This interpretation can be 
illustrated by a specific example: in the left sub-column of Table 3 the Frankfurt-London 
pairwise result is -1.77, which means that Frankfurt stock exchange exhibits smaller intensity 
in jumps of its index (DAX) than does London stock exchange; however, the difference in 
jump intensities on both markets is not very large. 
 From Table 3 a pattern emerges: price jump intensity is different before and after the 
European debt crisis unfolded. In most cases the jump intensity increased during the crisis but 
several anomalies are present. As we already reported in our illustrative example above, the 
jump intensity before the crisis is smaller on the Frankfurt stock exchange than on the London 
exchange (-1.77; left sub-column) and even increases afterwards (-3.21; right sub-column). 
Emerging stock markets almost uniformly exhibit larger intensity in jumps than both 
developed markets and the magnitude of the intensity is also greater. Out of the emerging 
stock markets only the Budapest stock exchange exhibits lower intensity than London during 
both periods (-1.52 and -0.06) but not with respect to Frankfurt (0.31 and 2.85). Further, the 
Istanbul stock market during the crisis period shows lower jump intensity than developed (-
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4.26 and -2.98 with respect to London and Frankfurt, respectively; right sub-column) and the 
rest of the emerging stock markets. Another feature stands out: the magnitude of the jump 
intensity during the European debt crisis period is highest on the Prague and Ljubljana stock 
markets that also exhibit higher jump intensity than other markets (right sub-column). The 
feature is less pronounced during the pre-crisis period (left sub-column), though. 
 In Table 4 we present the results of the Wilcoxon test on price jump intensities derived 
by Method 2. There is not much inter-period change found for the Frankfurt-London pair (-
0.93 and -0.76 for pre-crisis and crisis periods, respectively) and also the behavior of the 
Prague stock market with respect to both developed markets seems quite stable (0.46 vs. 0.61 
for the Prague-London pair; 1.16 vs. 1.08 for the Prague-Frankfurt pair). On the other hand, 
the effect of the European debt crisis can be seen on the pairs of the rest of the emerging 
markets as the intensities of price jumps in Budapest, Warsaw, Bucharest, Zagreb, and 
Ljubljana do change with respect to other markets during the crisis period. Further, these 
intensities for many pairs switch signs. For example, the Warsaw and Bucharest markets 
exhibited higher intensity of jumps than other markets before the crisis, but during the crisis 
period both markets show chiefly lower intensity of jumps than the rest of the markets. The 
Istanbul stock market exhibits the opposite pattern during the post-crisis period as it shows 
higher jump intensity than all the other stock markets with the single exception of a lower 
jump intensity than the market in Ljubljana (-2.81; right sub-column). This finding indicates 
that when volatility is accounted for in price jump identification, the Istanbul stock market 
exhibits remarkable sensitivity to the European debt crisis. 
It is also interesting to note that the very high magnitude of the jump intensity on the 
Prague market with respect to other markets detected by Method 1 (Table 3) disappeared 
when Method 2 was used. Only the Ljubljana market exhibits markedly higher intensity of 
price jumps than the rest of both developed and emerging markets during both periods (Table 
4). The reason for this peculiar behavior might lie in the fact that the Ljubljana stock 
exchange is opened only a few hours each day for trading. For continuous trading the open 
market session runs only from 9:30 a.m. to 12:50 p.m. Naturally, in terms of information 
flow, the market aims to capture whatever happened before opening and take positions with 
respect to the future before closing. However, the short trading interval means that all this has 
to be done at a much faster pace than on other markets. Potentially higher nervousness and 
uncertainty might be behind the markedly different price jump intensity behavior on the 
Ljubljana market. The result is quite robust as it is captured by both methods. 
Another interesting finding is represented by the visibly lowered jump intensity on the 
Warsaw stock market detected by Method 2 during the crisis period (Table 4, right sub-
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column). An explanation for this behavior should be sought behind the institutional set-up of 
the Polish financial market. Polish investment funds usually hold up to 40% of their assets in 
stocks: when stock prices rise (decrease) the same stocks are sold (bought) to keep the value 
of assets in balance. This process helps to smooth and lower market volatility. In other words, 
it does not prevent jumps but helps to avoid extreme returns. For that reason we can see 
mostly higher jump intensity of the Warsaw stock market during the crisis period with respect 
to other markets detected by Method 1 (Table 3, right sub-column) but lower jump intensity 
when volatility is accounted for (Table 4, right sub-column). 
 
5.2 Differences in jump intensities and volatility 
In Table 5 we present additional results that supplement our findings presented earlier in 
Tables 3 and 4. First, we formally test hypothesis A whether the (mean of) the jump intensity 
differs in the two periods under research. When we consider Method 1, the values of the z-
statistics of the Wilcoxon test reveal that jump intensities are not different between periods for 
the whole group or individual markets (Table 5; Method 1). The single exception is the 
Ljubljana stock market for which we can safely assert that jump intensities are different in 
both periods. Specifically, with the help of Table 4, we can see that the jump intensity on the 
Ljubljana stock market was high and about the same with respect to other markets but during 
the crisis period it increased and decreased with respect to other markets in about the same 
proportions. When we consider Method 2 the results change dramatically. Values of the z-
statistics show that jump intensities during both periods are markedly different (Table 5; 
Method 2). If we consult Table 4 again we can see that the difference in jump intensities do 
depend on the market pairs that exhibit an intensity increase or decrease without a firm 
pattern. Ljubljana is again an exception as it shows a uniformly huge increase in jump 
intensity with respect to all markets. We can sum up our supplementary findings in the 
following way. Our results indicate that jump intensity did not change in between periods 
when only jumps are considered. However, when the results of Method 2 are considered, 
volatility increased substantially but dramatic movements in values of indices did not. Hence, 
during the European debt crisis, the intensity of jumps did not increase but the uncertainty 
associated with the crisis transferred (only) to increased volatility. 
Second, we present the results of the test for Hypothesis B of variance equalities for the 
two periods. To assess it, we employ the F-test specified in (12). Table 6 reports the results of 
the test for both methods. We present two pieces of information for every test. First, we 
decide whether we can reject the null of the equality of variances at a given confidence level 
with respect to a two-sided alternative hypothesis. If we are able to reject the null hypothesis, 
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then we further provide an indicator whether the variance was higher (>) or lower (<) in the 
period before the crisis when compared to the period of the European debt crisis.  
For Method 1, we see that when all markets are taken together the variance 
significantly differs during the two periods. In particular, the variance of monthly intensities 
was higher during the pre-crisis period before the Greek bailouts. This finding indicates also a 
higher variance in the jump arrival process. The crisis therefore served as an element that 
homogenized the behavior of extreme price jump arrivals. In addition, a similar pattern is seen 
for the London market, while other markets do not show a significant difference between the 
two periods. The single difference is identified in Zagreb that shows the opposite behavior, 
albeit not as significant as in the London case. This suggests that the London Stock Exchange 
is the main driver of the difference between the two periods. This evidence can be understood 
by the fact that London was directly exposed to the US subprime mortgage crisis and post-
Lehman turmoil, which falls into the pre-European debt crisis period. Therefore, the likely 
driver of the excessive variance on London market originates from the spill-over of the 
distress in the US in 2008. 
Method 2 offers different insights as there is no lack of the statistical significance. In 
this case, all individual markets as well as the result of the aggregated market exhibit 
statistically significant differences between the two periods. In particular, in all cases (with 
the single exception of Ljubljana) the variance of the price jump intensity is higher during the 
first period before the European debt crisis emerged. This confirms the sensitivity of Method 
2 to the sub-prime mortgage crisis and post-Lehman turmoil. Therefore, we can conclude that 
in the ex-post analysis, Method 2 can lead us into a false sense of the increased variance of the 
arrival processes, which originates from the over-volatile markets after the Lehman Brothers 
collapse. Method 1, however, filters out the over-volatile bias of Method 2 and accentuates 
the Lehman Brothers’ effect only for the London market. 
If we combine the results of hypothesis B testing based on both methods we can 
conclude that with the exception of London and Zagreb, the variance of the price jump 
intensity could not be distinguished as different in the pre-crisis period from that during the 
crisis. 
 
5.3 Turkey – brief case study 
Finally, we aim to analyze the mutual relationship of the Turkish stock market with the rest of 
our sample as a case study. We apply the developed methodological framework described in 
the previous sections. The purpose of this section is to advocate quantitative results based on 
average intensity and assess the level of economic and financial integration (defined in terms 
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of the spill-over of extreme events) of the Istanbul stock exchange with respect to different 
European markets. 
We can split our sample into geographical regions: the two developed markets 
(London, Frankfurt); the Visegrad markets consisting of stock exchanges in Budapest, 
Warsaw, and Prague; the South European (SE) markets composed of stock exchanges in 
Bucharest, Zagreb, and Ljubljana. Our aim is to compare the Istanbul stock market with the 
three regions with respect to price jump-arrival properties and thus to establish a link with 
respect to the transmission of extreme events and their reaction to the distress caused by the 
European debt imbalances. 
Table 7 presents a pair-wise comparison of the distribution of monthly intensities 
between Turkey and the three regions for both methods. In particular, we use only the 
overlapping sample to have comparable data. First, Method 1 suggests that the intensity of 
price jump arrivals on the Istanbul stock exchange is on average significantly smaller than any 
of the three regions where the difference is lowest with respect to the developed markets. 
Therefore, we may conclude that Istanbul resembles by its price jump arrival properties stable 
developed markets rather than its counterparts in the SE and Visegrad markets that are 
regionally and economically more similar to Turkey. It may also suggest that Turkey is more 
affected by the large and developed European markets and the information spillovers flow 
from Europe mainly through the developed markets. In other words, the regional events 
contained within the boundaries of the SE and Visegrad markets do not have enough power to 
reach Istanbul. Despite the fact that Istanbul stock exchange is in terms of volatility closest to 
the SE markets, the similarity can be explained only through the overall periods of increased 
volatility, which are most likely to be driven by the existing European debt crisis. Moreover, 
Method 2 is not able to deliver a strong message since the difference in volatilities between 
Istanbul and the three other regions is not statistically significant in many cases. 
Based on our previous results we can draw some conclusions. When perceived through 
the optics of the monthly price jump arrival intensity, the Istanbul stock exchange seems to be 
closest to the developed markets. This suggests that the jump intensity of the Turkish stock 
market is linked to Europe through the main channel of the developed markets. Unfortunately, 
we do not have pre-crisis high-frequency data from the Borsa Istanbul. Therefore, we can use 
only the data from the crisis period, during which the Turkish stock market differs from other 
emerging European markets in terms of price jump behavior and its dynamics. In addition, our 
results suggest the existence of different correlation patterns in terms of extreme events. From 
the perspective of emerging markets investors, the Turkish market has to be considered an 
independent asset class with unique dynamics. The regulators, on the other hand, should 
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consider the different parametrization of the contagion effects and market panic for mainland 
Europe and Turkey and not include Turkey into the existing European regional groups. These 
recommendations will become more and more important, as the economic recovery after the 
European debt crisis and economic and financial integration will progress. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyzed the impact of the European debt crisis on the volatility and 
especially the price jump intensity in stock market indices reported by the set of stock 
exchanges on the European continent. We employed data from the stock exchanges of two 
developed (Frankfurt, London) and six emerging (Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, Zagreb, 
Bucharest, Ljubljana, Istanbul) markets during the period January 2008 to June 2012. 
 It is rather obvious that even ex post identification of the price jumps would depend on 
the actual method used, i.e., on the employed price jump indicator. Therefore, one can 
conclude that any analysis of jump distributions during financial distress would be method-
dependent. We use this apparent disadvantage in potentially useful way: to distinguish 
between a significant volatility increase and a change in price jump intensity. In order to do 
so, we employ two methods to distinguish stock price behavior from different perspectives. 
While Method 1 minimizes the probability of false jump detection (the Type-II Error-Optimal 
price jump indicator), Method 2 maximizes the probability of successful jump detection (the 
Type-I Error-Optimal price jump indicator). It means that Method 2 identifies not only price 
jumps but also periods with high volatility without any price jump appearance. 
We employed both methods on a number of pairs of stock market indices reported by 
several stock exchanges on European continent. We tested a hypothesis that there was no 
effect of the European debt crisis on the price jump intensity. Our analysis suggests that 
Method 2, which captures both price jumps and volatility, rejects the null hypothesis. A 
number of mature and emerging markets show both increased as well as increased levels of 
volatility during financial distress. The results are limited by some lack of statistical 
significance, though. In addition, we found that differences in price intensity are less 
pronounced when using Method 1, which focuses more on price jumps. From our results 
notable exceptions stand out. The Ljubljana stock market is clearly the market with the highest 
jump intensity, especially during the European debt crisis period. The Istanbul stock market 
exhibits higher jump intensity during the crisis period than other markets (with the exception 
of Ljubljana). To sum up, during the European debt crisis, the intensity of jumps did not 
increase but the uncertainty associated with the crisis transferred (only) to increased volatility. 
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Further, we tested the hypothesis that the variance of price jump intensities was 
different during the two periods. Following Method 1, we show that the variance on all 
markets taken together was lower in the period before the European debt crisis. However, the 
results for most of the individual markets are not statistically significant. On other hand, the 
results based on Method 2 are statistically significant and show lower variance during the pre-
crisis period for the majority of markets. Since Method 2 accounts not only for jumps but 
volatility on markets as well, we based our overall conclusion on Method 1 that filters out the 
over-volatile bias of Method 2. Hence, disregarding a couple of exceptions, the variance of 
the price jump intensity could not be distinguished as different in the pre-crisis period from 
that during the crisis. 
The regulatory consequences of our results can be linked to the Basel approach to financial 
distress. First, there is a common belief among risk practitioners and policy makers that the 
intensity of price jumps does uniformly increases during a period of financial distress. 
However, our results indicate that this pattern does not correspond to stock market behavior 
during a crisis. Second, there do exist differences in price jump dynamics across stock markets. 
Hence, investors have to model emerging and mature markets differently to properly reflect 
their individual dynamics. 
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Table 1. Market capitalization and turnover of analyzed stock markets 
 
Stock 
exchange 
(country) 
Stock Market Capitalization Turnover ratio  
2008 2010 2012 2008 2010 2012 
London 
(United 
Kingdom) 
69.9% 137.7% 124.0% 227.2% 101.9% 84.0% 
Frankfurt 
(Germany) 30.6% 43.5% 43.7% 193.3% 103.0% 91.8% 
Budapest 
(Hungary) 12.0% 21.5% 16.8% 93.0% 94.5% 54.6% 
Prague 
(Czech 
Republic) 
21.7% 21.7% 19.0% 70.4% 29.4% 27.0% 
Warsaw 
(Poland) 17.0% 40.5% 36.3% 45.7% 47.6% 42.6% 
Bucharest 
(Romania) 9.7% 19.7% 9.4% 11.3% 5.4% 11.5% 
Zagreb 
(Croatia) 38.5% 42.3% 38.2% 7.4% 4.1% 2.3% 
Ljubljana 
(Slovenia) 21.6% 20.1% 14.2% 6.9% 2.6% 6.2% 
Istanbul 
(Turkey) 16.1% 41.9% 39.1% 118.5% 158.4% 136.5% 
 
Note: Data were obtained from the World Bank database and accessed on September 23, 2013. The 
database is at: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-
development-indicators   
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Table 2. Summary statistics for stock market index returns 
 
Stock 
exchange 
Number of 
observations 
Characteristics based on a 5-minute frequency 
Mean 
Return Skewness Kurtosis 
Number of jumps 
detected 
Number of 
jumps per day 
whole 
period 
whole 
period 
whole 
period (1) (2) (1) (2) 
London 139,260 -2.11E-06 -1.25 134.5 800 1392 0.58 1.01 
Frankfurt 145,248 -3.14E-06 -0.06 23.1 682 1452 0.49 1.04 
Budapest 128,847 -9.79E-06 -0.40 40.8 689 1288 0.50 0.94 
Prague 116,048 -1.60E-05 -1.45 68.4 1374 1160 0.99 0.84 
Warsaw 129,173 -7.13E-06 0.16 20.0 905 1292 0.66 0.94 
Bucharest 79,421 -1.10E-05 -0.35 55.9 711 794 0.51 0.57 
Zagreb 85,500 -1.90E-05 0.08 505.7 731 854 0.53 0.62 
Ljubljana 38,567 -2.00E-05 -0.77 64.4 803 386 0.59 0.28 
Istanbul 39,586 -2.40E-06 -0.14 23.8 125 396 0.23 0.72 
 
Note: Columns denoted as (1) correspond to Method 1 for jump detection (integrated variance), while 
columns marked as (2) represent the results obtained for Method 2 (centile based). The different number 
of observations is mostly related to the different hours of operation. For example, while the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange opens at 9 a.m. and closes at 5:30 p.m., the Ljubljana Stock Exchange opens at 9:30 
a.m. at and closes at 1 p.m.; for continuous trading the open market session runs only from 9:30 a.m. to 
12:50 p.m. 
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Table 3. Pair-wise testing for the equality of mean jump intensities  
(Method 1, using integrated variance) 
 
Stock 
exchange 
London Frankfurt Budapest Prague 
Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis 
Frankfurt -1.77b -3,21a   
 
  
 
  
 Budapest -1.52c -0.06 0.32 2,85a   
 
  
 Prague 5,52a 7,46a 5,98a 7,41a 6,03a 7,38 a   
 Warsaw 1.28c 4,28 a 2,98 a 5,23 a 2,95 a 3,88 a -5,11 a -6,68 a 
Bucharest 2,87 a 4,87 a 4,42 a 5,51 a 4,31 a 4,79 a -3,92 a -3,53 a 
Zagreb 2,62 a 4,07 a 4,13 a 5,10 a 4,16 a 4,06 a -3,92 a -3,22 a 
Ljubljana 6,42 a 7,29 a 6,42 a 7,35 a 6,42 a 7,20 a 6,06 a 3,39 a 
Istanbul N/A -4.27 a N/A -2.98 a N/A -4.10 a N/A -6.74 a 
 
 
(continued) 
 
Stock 
exchange 
Warsaw Bucharest Zagreb Ljubljana 
Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis 
Frankfurt   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Budapest   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Prague   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Warsaw   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Bucharest 1.74 b 2,82 a   
 
  
 
  
 Zagreb 1.34 c 2,42 a -0.36 0,03   
 
  
 Ljubljana 6,42 a 6,63 a 6,36 a 5,16 a 6,34 a 4,91 a   
 Istanbul N/A -5.56 a N/A -5.99 a N/A -5.59 a N/A -6.66 a 
 
Note: The table contains the results of the Wilcoxon test (z-statistics, normally distributed) of the 
equality of jump intensities. Negative (positive) test statistics means that the stock market shown in a 
row has lower (higher) jump intensity than the market shown in the column. a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Pair-wise testing for the equality of mean jump intensities  
(Method 2, using extreme values, i.e., centiles) 
 
Stock 
exchange 
London Frankfurt Budapest Prague 
Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis 
Frankfurt -0.93 -0.76   
 
  
 
  
 Budapest -1.13 -0.34 -0.69 0.48   
 
  
 Prague 0.46 0.61 1.16 1.08 0.70 1.53c   
 Warsaw 0.92 -2.42a 1.62c -1.76b 1.10 -0.81 0.43 -2,98a 
Bucharest 1.31c -1.21 2.16b -0.59 1.36c 0.13 0.51 -1.46c 
Zagreb 1.13 -0.22 1.79b 0.34 1.44c 0.78 0.54 -0.43 
Ljubljana -2.9 a 4.79 a -1.97 b 4.56 a -2.30 b 4.41 a -2.89 a 4.77 a 
Istanbul N/A 1.27 N/A 1.51 c N/A 1.87 b N/A 1.21 
 
 
(continued) 
 
Stock 
exchange 
Warsaw Bucharest Zagreb Ljubljana 
Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis 
Pre-
crisis Crisis 
Frankfurt   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Budapest   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Prague   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Warsaw   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Bucharest 0.07 0.96   
 
  
 
  
 Zagreb 0.25 1.99b 0.11 0.88   
 
  
 Ljubljana -3.39 a 5.11a -3.59a 4.91 a -3.56 a 5.44 a   
 Istanbul N/A 2,47 a N/A 1.79 b N/A 1.61 c N/A -2,81 a 
 
Note: The table contains the results of the Wilcoxon test (z-statistics, normally distributed) of the 
equality of jump intensities. Negative (positive) test statistics means that the stock market shown in a 
row has lower (higher) jump intensity than the market shown in the column. a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Testing for the equality of the jump intensities before and during the crisis (after May 
1, 2010) 
 
Method 1 Method 2 
Stock market     
London 1.01 4.24 a 
Frankfurt 1.26 3.51 a 
Budapest -0.84 3.58 a 
Prague -0.21 3.97 a 
Warsaw -0.31 5.15 a 
Bucharest -0.90 5.25 a 
Zagreb -0.99 4.99 a 
Ljubljana 3.66 a -3.57 a 
All markets  0.55 8.39 a 
 
Note: The row marked “All markets” does not contain data from the Istanbul stock exchange, because of 
missing data for the pre-crisis period. A negative (positive) number for the test statistics corresponds to 
the situation when jump intensity is lower (higher) before the financial crisis. a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The column denoted as “Method 1” 
corresponds to the Method 1for jump detection (integrated variance), while the column marked as 
“Method 2” represents the results obtained for Method 2 (centile based). 
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Table 6. Testing for the equality of the variances of jump intensities before and during the crisis 
(after May 1, 2010) 
 
Stock market Method 1 Method 2 
London 4.36 a  “>” 14.57 a  “>” 
Frankfurt 1.42 6.99 a  “>” 
Budapest 1.32 12.04 a  “>” 
Prague 1.75 22.72 a  “>” 
Warsaw 1.53 6.99 a  “>” 
Bucharest 0.65 3.40 a  “>” 
Zagreb 0.41 b  “<” 53.03a  “>” 
Ljubljana 0.60 0.43 b  “<” 
All markets  1.485 a  “>” 7.85 a  “>” 
 
Note: The row marked “All markets” does not contain data from the Istanbul stock exchange, because of 
missing data for the pre-crisis period. a, b, and c denote statistical significance the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, for the two-sided alternative. Additionally, the sign > denotes that the variance is 
higher in the period before the crisis, and the sign < denotes that the variance is lower during the 
European debt crisis period. The column denoted as “Method 1” corresponds to Method 1 for jump 
detection (integrated variance), while the column marked as “Method 2” represents the results obtained 
for Method 2 (centile based). We apply the classic F-test, with a null hypothesis that the variances of 
jump intensities in two sub-periods are equal (the corresponding critical values are F(27,37)).  
 
  
 
29 
Table 7. Pair-wise testing for the equality of mean jump intensities  
(Method 1, using integrated variance) 
 
 
Developed Markets Visegrad Region SE Markets Turkey 
Developed Markets 
   Visegrad Region 5.98 a   
 SE Markets 7.97 a 4.84 a  
 Turkey -3.38 a -5.90 a -6.92 a 
  
(Method 2, using centiles) 
 
 
Developed Markets Visegrad Region SE Markets Turkey 
Developed Markets 
   Visegrad Region -0.78   
 SE Markets 2.16 b 3.11 a  
 Turkey 1.49 c  2.07 b -0.19 
  
Note: The table contains the results of the Wilcoxon test (z-statistics, normally distributed) of the 
equality of jump intensities. Negative (positive) test statistics means that the stock market shown in a 
row has lower (higher) jump intensity than the market shown in the column. a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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